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‘Super Kids’: Regulating the Use of Cognitive and Psychological 
Enhancements in Children 
 
Gareth Hagger Johnson* and Lynn Hagger** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With headlines such as, ‘Get smart drugs out of the closet, scientists urge’ and ‘Smart 
drugs for straight As’,1 discussions about individuals taking psychopharmaceutical drugs 
to enhance their cognitive performance2 are increasingly in the public domain. In the US, 
drugs such as Modafinil are being used by university students because they provide a 
more targeted, powerful mental ‘sharpening’ than traditional stimulants such as caffeine 
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1
 Lucy Bannerman, ‘Get smart drugs out of the closet, scientists urge’ The Times (London 27 February 
2010) and Peta Bee, ‘Smart drugs for straight As’ The Times (London 14 May 2007); see, also Alexandra 
Frean and Patrick Foster, ‘Cheating students turn to “smart drug” for edge in exams’ The Times (London 23 
June, 2007). 
2
 Martha J Farah, Judy Illes, Robert Cook-Degan, Howard Gardner, Eric Kandel, Patricia King, Barbara 
Sahakian and Paul Root Wolpe, ‘Neurocognitive enhancement: what can we do and what should we do?’ 
(2004) 5 Nature Reviews Neuroscience 421. 
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in its various forms.3  Such drugs are readily available on the Internet4 and the US 
experience is reflected in the UK.5 There have been calls from a former governmental 
Chief Scientific Officer to make ‘smart’ pills available for all.6   His report noted 
scientists’ calls for the removal of restrictions from cognitive enhancers that have been 
dubbed ‘cosmetic neurology’ and ‘nip and tuck’ for the mind.7  It is perhaps unsurprising 
that many of these drugs are already being used ‘off-label’, whereby an approved drug 
may be used in ways not specifically sanctioned although it is likely to be supported with 
scientific evidence.8 The prospect for older individuals to avoid debilitating conditions 
such as Alzheimer’s disease is exciting and the popular perception is that there are no 
obvious short-term harmful effects.9 However, these psychopharmacological drugs do 
have side-effects and have the potential to become addictive.10 In addition, they target 
                                                 
3
 Simon M Outram, `The use of methylphenidate among students: the future of enhancement?' (2010) 36(4) 
Journal of Medical Ethics 198-202; Quinton Babcock and Tom Byrne, ‘Student perceptions of 
methylphenidate abuse at a public liberal arts college’ (2000) 49 Journal of American College Health 143. 
4
 N 1. 
5
 Alexandra Frean, ‘Let students take drugs to boost brainpower, says leading academic’ The Times, 1 
January 2009. 
6
 The Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs project led by Sir David King, Director of the Office of Science 
and Technology and Chief Scientific Adviser to Government until 2007 <www.foresight.gov.uk> accessed 
14 March 2011.  
7
 Ibid. 
8 This is often the case with children’s medication: Peter Hill, ‘Off licence and off label prescribing in 
children: litigation fears for physicians’ (2005) 90 Archives of Disease in Childhood  17. 
9
 N 1. 
10
 Outram (n 3). 
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molecular events underlying cognition and emotion,11 and there is a concern that there 
may be long-term consequences such as cognitive decline, even when taken by the 
young.12 Enhancement of psychological traits, such as personality or cognitive ability, 
has particular ethical, legal and social implications when applied to children. Of 
particular concern are the potential effects on personal identity, which is a core aspect of 
the self.13 There are also ethical concerns of widening the gap between those able to 
afford the drugs and those who cannot, but a detailed examination of this is beyond the 
scope of this paper.14 
 
Cognitive enhancing drugs are widely available on the Internet and include those 
available through a prescription but are more likely to be off-label. They may possibly be 
counterfeit,15 as well as technically illegal because their supply outside of the jurisdiction 
                                                 
11
 Paul Root Wolpe, ‘Treatment, enhancement, and the ethics of neurotherapeutics’ (2002) 50 Brain and 
Cognition  387.  
12
 British Medical Association (BMA), Boosting your brainpower: ethical aspects of cognitive 
enhancement (London 29 November 2007) 7; Farah et al (n 2) and Danielle C Turner and Barbara J 
Sahakian, ‘Neuroethics of Cognitive Enhancement’ (2006) 1 Biosocieties  113.  
13
 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Polity Press, 1991). 
14
 For a discussion on some of the implications for society see Michael J Selgelid, ‘An Argument against 
Arguments for Enhancement’ (2007) 1(1) Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 1. 
15
 See World Health Organisation, Medicines: counterfeit medicines 2010 for the claim that up to 10 per 
cent of all medication is fake or substandard (25 per cent in developing countries) 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/> accessed 14 May 2011. 
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breaches national regulations.16 This accessibility may require its own approaches. Many 
will prefer to use traditional routes to access these drugs and this will be the focus here: 
there will be concern about the sale of fraudulent drugs on the Internet, about potential 
interaction with drugs already being taken and because many patients want the 
reassurance of what they will perceive to be balanced advice from their doctors.17  There 
will be those who doubt that parents would even consider giving their children cognitive 
enhancement with unknown side effects, but evidence suggests that many would.18 
 
Part I of this paper sets out what is meant by cognitive enhancement. Part II 
provides key arguments both opposing and supporting its use. We wish to contribute to 
the current debate by setting out how decisions should be made about the use of cognitive 
enhancement in children. Part III explores the rationale for involving children as much as 
possible in personal decision-making and policy-making processes. The main proposal 
here is that legally competent children should decide whether to use cognitive 
enhancement, not their parents. Even if not legally competent, children should be as fully 
involved in the decision-making process as possible. With this in mind, Part IV sets out 
proposals for a regulatory framework that embraces principles of good practice. No 
                                                                                                                                                 
See also Sam Lister, ‘Treat medicine counterfeiters like traffickers, says Glaxo chief’ The Times (London 2 
October 2010) for a call to impose harsher sentences on those involved in the manufacture and supply of 
counterfeit drugs.  
16
 Jonathan Richards, ‘Online drugs “put patients at risk”’ The Times (London 20 August 2007). 
17
 Wendy Levinson, Audiey Kao, Alma Kuby and .Roanald A Thisted, ‘Not All Patients Want to 
Participate in Decision Making’ (2005) 20(6) Journal of  General  Internal Medicine  531. 
18
 See discussion at n 102ff . 
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assumptions will be made about the benefits or otherwise of cognitive enhancement. 
Decisions will have to be taken at a societal level about the provision of enhancement 
generally and cognitive enhancement specifically. Responsible development and use of 
enhancing technologies19 should be carried out in accordance with Brownsword’s 
demand that this respect rights and preserve the conditions necessary for a prospering 
moral community.20 This would address the recent call for appropriate risk and ethical 
assessments to be undertaken in parallel.21 If cognitive enhancement is made available 
through legitimate mechanisms, then, provided a balanced picture of its use is presented, 
we advocate choice over rather more nebulous safety concerns. 
  
I.  WHAT IS COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT? 
 
Cognitive enhancement is defined as ‘internal methods of enhancement by members of 
the population who do not have a specific medical condition or recognised health 
impairment’,22 that is, for improving the psychological function of individuals who are 
                                                 
19
 As advocated by Henry Greely, Barbara Sahakian, John Harris, Ronald C Kessler, Michael Gazzaniga, 
Philip Campbell and Martha J Farah, ‘Towards |Responsible Use of Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs by the 
Healthy’ (2008) Nature (7 December) 702. 
20
 Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulating Human Enhancement: Things Can Only Get Better?’(2009) 1(1) Law, 
Innovation and Technology 125, 151 
21
 The Royal Society, Brain Waves.Module 2:Neuroscience: implications for education and lifelong 
learning, February 2011, 15. 
22
 BMA (n 12). 
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not ill.23 A more refined definition suggests that cognitive enhancement occurs where 
cognitive and/or behavioural functioning is not impaired at clinically significant levels in 
a particular context.24  Methylphenidate (hereafter, Ritalin) is an example of a 
neurotechnology that could be used as a cognitive enhancement. Ritalin has cognitive 
enhancing properties and has been available since the 1960s.25  When it is used in people 
with no diagnosed condition of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), 
performance improves significantly because of a heightened ability to concentrate.  
Turner describes how many of the brain’s executive functions, such as attention, 
problem-solving and adapting behaviour, are susceptible to the influence of 
pharmacological agents such as Ritalin.26 Perhaps not surprisingly in the highly 
competitive culture of the US, it appears that many parents are seeking ADHD diagnoses 
                                                 
23
 Farah et al (n 1). For a comprehensive survey of the ethical and policy questions that arise from 
biotechnological advances see the President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and 
the Pursuit of Happiness  (Regan Books, Harper Collins, 2003) passim. 
24
 Ilina Singh and Kelly J Kelleher, ‘Neuroenhancement in Young People: Proposal for Research, Policy, 
and Clinical Management’ (2010)  1(1)  AJOB Neuroscience 3. 
25
 Even the practice of Ritalin prescribing for treatment of ADHD itself is controversial. It has been argued 
that the condition is a US-inspired fad, an excuse for bad parenting, a quick and easy diagnosis for over-
burdened doctors or ‘disease-mongering’ by pharmaceutical companies keen to sell more drugs. Fukuyama 
argued that parents and teachers use Ritalin as a ‘medical shortcut’ to enhancement: Francis Fukuyama, 
Our posthuman future: Consequences of the biotechnology revolution  (Profile Books, 2003) 49. 
26
 Turner and Sahakian (n 12). Drugs newer to the market are also viable as cognitive enhancers. Turner’s 
research showed that Modafinil (originally intended to treat narcolepsy) improves working memory in 
healthy, young volunteers, adults with ADHD and patients with schizophrenia with minimal side effects. 
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so that they obtain Ritalin for their offspring to improve their life chances.27 Ritalin is 
currently only available in the UK legitimately with a prescription.28   
 
Except in cases of severe intellectual disability, typically defined as an IQ below 
70,29 attempting to improve the cognitive function of children with below average levels 
of ability (IQ 70 to 100) is enhancement, not treatment. Although children with low 
cognitive ability are relatively disadvantaged, they are within the normal and able range 
of functioning. Those with below average levels of intelligence are still ‘intellectually 
intact’, to use Whitehouse et al’s30 term.  Exceptions occur when ability has been affected 
adversely by a factor in the external environment. For example, consider a case where 
lead poisoning lowered a child's IQ from 100 to 85, raising it back would count as a 
                                                 
27
  Anjan Chatterjee, `The promise and predicament of cosmetic neurology', (2006) 32(2) Journal of 
Medical Ethics 110. The drug was re-classified in the US as a Class II drug in 1971.  A Class II 
classification is warranted where the drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse but does have a 
currently accepted medical use in treatment or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions. In 
addition, abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence: 
Larry H. Diller, ‘The run on Ritalin. Attention deficit disorder and stimulant treatment in the 1990s’ (1996) 
26 Hastings Center Report 26, 12-18; Root Wolpe (n 11).  A US study in 2000 showed that up to 20 per 
cent of health college students reported Ritalin use there: Babcock and Byrne (n 3). 
28
 Such application is equally plausible in the British context: BMA (n 12); Farah et al (n 2); Turner and 
Sahakian (n 12) and Frean (n 5). 
 
29
 World Health Organisation. The ICD–10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical 
Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines 1992.  
30
 Peter J Whitehouse, EricJuengst, Maxwell Mehlman and Thomas H Murray, `Enhancing cognition in the 
intellectually intact' (1997) 27(3) Hastings Center Report 14. 
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treatment.31 If there was no toxin, but medication raised it from 85 to 100, this would 
count as an enhancement. The nature of individual differences in cognitive ability is that 
half of children have below average ability by definition.32 
 
Treatment can be distinguished from enhancement by reflecting on the purpose of 
medical and educational provision. Medical treatment is intended to restore ‘proper 
functioning’,33 i.e. species-typical functioning,34 where ‘there is a malfunctioning part’ 
and is intended to improve health outcomes.35 This includes preventive medicine, where 
there is an attempt to prevent disease before it occurs, at the population level. For 
Daniels,36 the role of medicine is to allow patients to experience the normal range of 
opportunity. This is why parents may encourage a balanced diet and immunisation for 
their children. The term ‘range’ is important: it acknowledges that health outcomes are 
                                                 
31
 Peter H Schwartz, ‘Defending the distinction between treatment and enhancement’, (2005) 5 American 
Journal of Bioethics 17. 
32
 Charles Murray, Real Education: Four Simple Truths for Bringing America's Schools Back to Reality 
(Crown New York:Forum, 2008). 
33
 Norman Daniels, ‘A Lifespan Approach to Health Care’ in Nancy Jecker  (ed), Ageing and Ethics 
(Humanities Press, 1991). 
34
 John Harris commenting on the work of Christpher Boorse, ‘On the distinction between disease and 
illness in Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Scanlon (eds), Medicine and Moral Philosophy 
(Princeton University Press, 1981) 49-68 and Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification  (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 185 in ‘Enhancements are a moral obligation’ (2005)  WellcomeScience 18. 
35
  Whitehouse et al (n 30) 14-22. 
36
 John Harris, ‘One principle and three fallacies of disability studies’ (2001) 27 Journal of Medical Ethics 
383. 
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distributed unequally in society. Similarly, one of the purposes of education is to provide 
equality of educational opportunity, but with the expectation that these educational 
outcomes differ, are graded, ranked and unequal. The role of healthcare and education is 
‘to produce “normal competitors”’ but not necessarily equal competitors’: 37 put another 
way, medical care and education are provided as treatments, not enhancements because 
they ‘level the playing field’38 within a normal range which is generally considered 
typical for a society. In contrast, cognitive enhancements are attempts to improve upon 
species-typical parameters.39 Daniels disagrees that education is comparable to treatment. 
For him, education is already an enhancement technology, merely another of the ‘ways 
that our uniquely innovative species tries to improve itself’.40 This invokes an alternative 
definition of enhancement, a movement beyond species (rather than individual) limits.  
 
The opportunities for self-enhancement and for parents to enhance their children 
may prove to be irresistible given its superficial attractiveness and its availability on the 
Internet.41  People already self-medicate to improve performance in many domains,42 and 
                                                 
37
 Norman Daniels, ‘Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction’  (2000) 9(3) 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 309. 
38
 Ibid 322. 
39
 Eric T Juengst, ‘What does enhancement mean?’ in Erik Parens (ed), Enhancing Human Traits 
(Georgetown University Press, 1998). 
40
 Greely et al (n 19), 702. 
41
 <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/postpn285.pdf> accessed 14 March 2011. 
42
 Eg using caffeine, herbal stimulants, tonics and other over-the-counter remedies: Turner and Sahakian (n 
12). 
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if cognitive enhancement can be shown to have minimal risks and reliable benefits, 
several commentators argue that their usage should be encouraged subject to ‘appropriate 
research and evolved regulation’.43 Potential for side effects and adverse events 
associated with cognitive enhancers, (whether existing now or brought to the market in 
the future), need to be considered carefully.44 If risks from cognitive enhancement are 
demonstrated, these risks need to be managed and regulated in the same way as other 
controlled substances.45 As we have seen, there is also concern that the drugs may be 
counterfeit46 which increases the risk of harm if they are toxic, inherently or because of 
chemical reaction with other drugs that may be taken at the same time. It is not surprising 
then that commentators have already noted that the Internet should be more closely 
regulated for this reason47 and that global threats require a global approach.48 The 
                                                 
43
 Greely et al (n 19) 702. 
44
 Farah et al (n 2). 
45
 Turner and Sahakian (n 12) and Danielle C Turner and Barbara J Sahakian, ‘Ethical questions in 
functional neuroimaging and cognitive enhancement’ (2006) 4 Poiesis Prax 81. See also Shaheen E Lakhan 
and Gareth E Hagger-Johnson, ‘The impact of prescribed psychotropics on youth’ (2007) 3 Clinical 
Practice and Epidemiology in Mental Health 21. 
46
 Richards (n 16). 
47
 Sorrel Downer, ‘The perils of self prescription’ Financial Times (London 6 May 2006) 1. It is clear from 
events in Pakistan that more can be done where there is a will even though we may not approve of such 
draconian measures: Jeremy Page, ‘YouTube cut off over offensive cartoons’ The Times (London 25 
February 2008). Such an approach may prove to be difficult in the European context: see the discussion 
below at n 206ff and <http://www.ehfcn.org/eu-corner/eu-policy/counterfeit-medicines/> accessed 14 
March 2011 which outlines the current European position. 
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European Parliament has proposed new legislation that will allow the possibility for 
tough sanctions to be imposed on counterfeiters.49 It will be some time before this 
becomes effective and is unlikely to completely resolve the problem. 
 
Having set out what is meant by cognitive enhancement, the following section 
highlights the specific issues it raises for children.50 
 
II. COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT: AN OBLIGATION, A RIGHT OR A STEP TOO 
FAR? 
 
Safety concerns about cognitive enhancements can be found elsewhere51 and justify 
arguments for further research52 and regulation. Knowledge about risks may increase as 
the evidence base improves, 53 but as it currently stands, the risks and benefits are not 
clear. The problems associated with equal access to cognitive enhancements are not the 
                                                                                                                                                 
48
 Carlisle E George, ‘Internet Pharmacies: Global threat requires a global approach to regulation’ (2006) 
4(1) Hertfordshire Law Journal  12. 
<http://www.herts.ac.uk/fms/documents/schools/law/HLJ_V4I1_George.pdf> accessed 14 March 2011. 
49
 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110215IPR13734/html/Fake-medicines-
Parliament-approves-new-rules-to-protect-patients-better> accessed 14 March 2011. 
50
 For a detailed discussion of ethical perspectives on enhancement more generally, see Brownsword (n 20). 
51
 See, for example, BMA (n 12) 11 and 17 which provides an overview of some of these concerns. 
52
 Dimitris Repantis, Peter Schlattmann, Oona Laisney and Isabella Heuser,(2010). `Modafinil and 
methylphenidate for neuroenhancement in healthy individuals: A systematic review'. (2010) 62(3) 
Pharmacological Research 187. 
53
 Chatterjee (n 27). 
THIS IS A PRE-PEER REVIEWED DRAFT. PUBLISHED VERSION 
AVAILABLE AT http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/175799611796399867 
 12
focus of this paper but are clearly important if cognitive enhancers become regulated. We 
largely ‘tolerate’ inequalities in access to health care54 but these issues do raise concerns 
about society’s vision and the type of citizens it wishes to have.55 Unregulated access to 
cognitive enhancers can also result in the ‘red queen’ effect, in which attempts to 
improve children’s cognitive ability reap no net benefit56 and average levels of ability, 
and normal levels of cognitive functions such as attention span, could become 
pathologised.57 Our paper largely concerns the interplay between the effects of cognitive 
enhancement on children’s character and respect for their autonomous interests.   
 
Enhancement of cognition, mood and/or emotion raises concerns about possible 
dubious effects on character which may be seen as inauthentic if children’s right to self-
creation, sense of personal responsibility and experience of an unmedicated self are 
threatened.58 Drugs can change the way we feel about and represent ourselves59 and how 
others see us. Externally focused ‘shortcuts to excellence’ are accepted in many 
                                                 
54
 Chatterjee (n 27) and Farah et al (n 2). Cf G Horn, J Barnes, R Brownsword, JFW Deakin, I Gilmore, M 
Hickman, L Iversen, T Robbins, E Taylor and J Wolff, Brain science addiction and drugs (Academy of 
Medical Sciences, 2008).   
55
 See Derek Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), Chapter 2. 
56
  Ibid. 
57
  Schwartz (n 31).See also An Ravelingien, Johan Braeckman, Luc Crevits, Dirk De Ridder and Eric 
Mortier, ‘”Cosmetic Neurology” and the Moral Complicity Argument’ (2009) 2(3) Neurethics 151. 
58
 Singh and Kelleher (n 24) 8. 
59
 Paul Martin and Richard Ashcroft, Neuroscience, Ethics and Society: a review of the field. Background 
paper prepared for the 2005 Wellcome Trust Summer School on ‘neuroethics’. 
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domains,60 and there can be an increased sense of agency on the part of young people.61 
However, others suggest that internally focused cognitive enhancement ‘break[s] some 
unwritten rules’62 and involves cheating thus giving children the right to refuse it because 
it seems unfair. Even young children understand morals63 and the ethical implications of 
cheating.64  If enhancement is not regarded as cheating, children may regret being 
enhanced in later life: ‘cognitive performances are not only valued as such, but are also 
valued for the manner in which they are achieved’.65 When cognitive enhancement 
divorces performance from effort, the risk is that the individual can become de-
humanised66 and their dignity compromised.67  
                                                 
60
 Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, `Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges' 
(2009) 15(3) Science and Engineering Ethics 311. 
61
 Singh and Kelleher (n 24) 8. 
62
 See eg Maartje Schermer, `On the argument that enhancement is "cheating"', (2008) 34(2) Journal of 
Medical Ethics 85. 
63
 Judith Dunn, Jane Brown and Mary Maguire, ‘The development of children’s moral sensibility: 
Individual differences and emotion understanding’ (1995) 31 Developmental Psychology 649 and Nicholas 
Lake, Sophie Lane and Paul L Harris, ‘The expectation of guilt and resistance to temptation’ (1995) 4  
EarlyDevelopment and Parenting 63. 
64
 Lake et al ibid and Matt Woolgar, Howard Steele, Miriam Steele, Susan Yabsley and Peter Fonagy 
‘Children's play narrative responses to hypothetical dilemmas and their awareness of moral emotions’ 
(2001) 19(1) British Journal of Developmental Psychology 115. 
65
 Schermer (n 62) 87. 
66
 Leon R Kass, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (Encounter Books: 
2002) at 12 in particular.    
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Enhancement could also ‘undermine senses of identity and what gives meaning to 
our lives’68 given personality traits and cognitive abilities are strong determinants of 
individual character. They refer to ‘. . . those characteristics of the person that account for 
consistent patterns of thinking, feeling and behaving.’69 Traits have become a dominant 
model in psychology because they are core aspects of the person and show impressive 
stability across the lifespan.70 A range of personality traits and other individual 
differences are part of species-typical functioning.71 Changing this variation could be 
hazardous. Natural selection may have favoured a balance between different personality 
traits, some helpful and some harmful, depending on the environment and situation.  
Cognitive enhancement may attempt to target a narrow range of traits, removing 
important individual differences from the population. Even ‘undesirable’ traits, such as 
low cognitive ability, may have adaptive features which have evolved over time72 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
67
 Dignity is variously conceptualised in the medico-legal field. Beyleveld and Brownsword’s ‘dignity as 
constraint’ incorporates the idea that it is as wrong to compromise one’s own dignity as much as that of 
others is apposite.Beyleveld and Brownsword (n 55) Chapter 1. 
68
 Chatterjee (n 27) 111. 
69
 Lawrence Pervine, Daniel Cervine and Oliver John, Personality: Theory and Research (Wiley, 9th edn 
2004) 6. 
70
 Stephen Soldz and George E Vaillant, ‘The Big Five personality traits and the life course: A 45-year 
longitudinal study’ (1999) 33 Journal of Research in Personality 208. 
71
 BMA (n 12) 24. 
72
 Nicholas B Allen and Paul BT Badcock, `Darwinian models of depression: A review of evolutionary 
accounts of mood and mood disorders' (2006) 30(5) Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and 
Biological Psychiatry 815. 
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eliminating them may have unintended consequences. Highly intelligent individuals may 
possess maladaptive personality traits, for example: [a]n individual with brilliant 
intellectual skills may not necessarily be happy and could still be prejudiced, intolerant or 
socially inept’ … ‘[society does] not need only very highly intelligent people’.’73 There 
are probably benefits for the population from having a mixture of traits between 
individuals even if we do not fully understand the evolutionary reasons for this.  
 
There are particular concerns about the potential for cognitive enhancements to be 
used as ‘techniques of exercising control over children, since parents are more likely to 
desire to help their children fit the mold and conform to the conventional pattern than to 
seek social conformity for themselves’.74 Unprecedented opportunities to make children 
conform to conventional standards could also reduce mankind’s receptiveness to a range 
of human dispositions, thwarting the potential for children’s individuality to a more 
dramatic extent than has hitherto been possible.  
 
As Turner argues, the brain deserves ethical consideration because ‘. . . we 
primarily define and distinguish ourselves as individuals by our behaviour and 
personality.’75 Cognitive abilities and personality traits are ‘fragile, fragmented and 
embedded’ concepts.76 Modifying these changes people, so enhancing the cognition of 
                                                 
73
 BMA (n 12) 18-19. 
74
 President’s Council (n 23) 90. 
75
 Turner and Sahakian (n 12) 116. 
76
 Ilina Singh, ‘Will the "real boy" please behave: dosing dilemmas for parents of boys with ADHD’ (2005) 
5 American Journal of Bioethics 34. 
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children need to be evaluated in terms of possible violations of the principles of 
autonomy, dignity and respect for the individual. It could be perceived as improving 
control of cognitive abilities. However, cognition is ‘intrinsically linked with our 
personality and individuality’77 so decisions to enhance cognition in children may 
infringe their identity and there is established evidence that young people have a clear 
sense of their unique, distinctive features.78    
 
While there is unease about safety, the preceding discussion highlights how the 
benefits and risks of taking cognitive enhancement will become more apparent. Here, the 
main concern is in relation to the effect they may have on the character and personal 
identity of children. If the risks are shown to be minimal, there is at least an argument 
that cognitive enhancement could have positive outcomes for children.  
 
It has been argued that concerns about cognitive enhancements outlined above are 
simply ‘spectres’79 and commentators such as Harris80 propose that there is a moral 
obligation to pursue optimal enhancement and confer even small benefits when these 
become known: this is the purpose of conducting medical research to discover 
                                                 
77
 BMA (n12) 3. 
78
 Marjorie Rutter and Michael Rutter, Developing Minds: Challenge and Continuity across the Life Span  
(Penguin, 1993) 253-254. 
79
 Editorial, `Enhancing, not cheating'. (2007) 450(7168) Nature 320. 
80
 John Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, (Oxford University Press, 1992), John Harris, ‘Is there a 
coherent social conception of disability?’ (2006) 26(2) Journal of Medical Ethics  95 and Harris (n 36) 
passim 
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treatments.81  He emphasises that such opportunities must undergo a risk assessment but 
avoid the use of the precautionary principle so prevalent in current debate.82 Opposition 
to enhancement, taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that diseases of old age will 
no longer be addressed. 83 For him, the moral imperative in using technology to improve 
people’s life chances includes cognitively enhanceing intellectual performance:84 the only 
discussion should be about the level of risk that is acceptable for both individuals and 
society.   
 
Hopkins85 proposes a means by which cognitive enhancement can be viewed as a 
human right. He rejects pure, content-free autonomy claims as immature and ‘vapidly 
libertine’86 in preference for a version that is both rational and practical.87 Hopkins 
                                                 
81Ibid. 
82
 For adherents of a more precautionary approach, see Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, ‘The perils of 
cognitive enhancement and the urgent imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity’ (2010) 
Journal of Applied Philosophy(forthcoming): 
<http://www.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/Pubs/Savulescu/moral_enhancement.pdf> accessed 14 March 2011.   
See also Turner and Sahakian (2006) (n 45) and Farah  et al (n 2) who advocate a more precautionary 
stance. 
83
 Harris (n 34) and Daniels (n 33). 
84
 John Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People (Princeton University 
Press, 2007) passim.  
85
 Patrick D Hopkins, ‘Is enhancement worthy of being a right?’ (2008) 18(1) Journal of Evolution and 
Technology 1. 
86
 Ibid 2. See also John Coggon, ‘Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English Law: 
Justifiable Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism?’ (2007) 15(3) Health Care Analysis 235. 
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believes that an appeal to important, worthwhile and reasonable interests is more 
grounded, serving to realise the potential goodness of our lives. The pursuit of knowledge 
(as represented by cognitive enhancement) is a legitimate claim, and one that is aligned 
with the classic values of natural law. It is worth re-iterating his note of caution that to be 
recognised as a right, cognitive enhancement must be worthwhile, dignified and noble, 
not merely perceived as such.88 We must be more rigorous if we wish to defend cognitive 
enhancement and avoid the shorthand of (shallow) autonomy claims, but it is a useful 
starting point given its legal recognition in cases affecting adults and children.89  
 
Our intention is not to raise a new ‘spectre’. We believe neurotechnologies could 
affect children’s dignity and autonomy, not simply because of their possible implications 
but also because of the potential lack of involvement in decision-making. The decision to 
enhance has implications for safety, inequality, character and autonomy, and this is why 
legal clarification on the extent to which children should be involved is essential. Part of 
any deliberations about the use of cognitive enhancement must note the difficulties 
associated with the unintended side-effects, and that some affected personality traits, 
while commonly perceived to have negative qualities, may prove to have adaptive 
functions in the longer term.  Perhaps this potential should preclude the possible gains to 
the individual in the short term. If we agree with advocates for cognitive enhancement, 
                                                                                                                                                 
87
 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 6 where he 
lists the broad range of meanings attributed to autonomy and Coggon  ibid. 
88
 Hopkins (n 85) 6. 
89
 Eg Re B (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 FCR1 and Mabon v Mabon et al [2005] 3 WLR 
460 whereThorpe LJ commented that there should be increased recognition of children’s autonomy. 
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should parents be permitted to enhance their children at will? The important issue for us, 
regardless of eventual outcomes, is that decisions to use cognitive enhancement requires 
a more robust approach than is currently the case. The following section explores briefly 
the rationale for involving children as much as possible in the decision-making process. 
 
III. CHILDREN’S INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION-MAKING 
 
A. Children and Personal Decision-making 
 
In the case of younger children who lack legal competency,90 the decision to give them 
cognitive enhancement is likely to be made by parents. The fact that parents should act in 
a child's best interests is a well-established legal principle.91 On this basis, making 
children eat their greens, do their homework and receive treatments for psychological and 
physical illnesses would be acceptable.92 Attempts to give children a competitive edge 
are considered customary,93 though the pressures from these are not always in the child’s 
                                                 
90
 Ie do not satisfy the Gillick  test as having ‘sufficient understanding and intelligence’ to make a decision: 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 189.  
91
 Ibid 184 per Lord Scarman.  
92
 See the discussion of best interests in Lynn Hagger, ‘Parental Responsibility and Children’s Health Care 
Treatment ‘ in Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring (eds), Responsible Parents and 
Parental Responsibility (Hart, 2009). 
93
 As Chatterjee notes, it is not unusual for professionals to work 80 or 90 hours a week, while their 
children enrol in several sports and after school music programmes .to ensure they can make competitive 
applications to colleges: Chatterjee (n 27) 111. 
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best interests94 and they may reflect the interests of the parents.95 Potential adverse side 
effects of cognitive enhancement have yet to be given the oxygen of wide publicity,96 so 
parents could view it as providing a positive benefit to their children or at least a risk 
worth taking all things being equal.  It is also arguable that all that a parent is required by 
the law to do is act in a way which is not against a child’s best interests.97  This could be 
seen as a dilution of the welfare principle98 and could render non-therapeutic 
interventions lawful provided they do not cause significant harm.99 This means that even 
if portraying cognitive enhancement as a clearly beneficial intervention presents 
                                                 
94
 Deborah A Phillips, ‘Socialization of Perceived Academic Competence among Highly Competent 
Children’ (1987) 58(5) Child Development 1308. 
95
 See e.g. Meir Statman and Jessica A Weng, ‘Investments across Cultures: Financial Attitudes of Chinese 
Americans’, (2010) 11(1) The Journal of Investment Consulting 38 and <http://genxfinance.com/love-and-
money-between-parents-and-children/> accessed 14 March 2011 for an example of different cultural 
expectations. 
96
 Anjan Chatterjee, ‘Is it acceptable for people to take methylphenidate to enhance performance? No’ 
(2009) 338 British Medical Journal  b1956 where she discusses evidence of abuse and dependence, sudden 
death, cardiovascular adverse events and cardiac arrhythmia in older people. 
97
 See S v S [1972] AC 24 where it was considered that to allow paternity testing against the mother’s 
wishes would not be against the child’s interests and was justifiable in the general public interest. 
98
 Marie Fox and Jean McHale, ‘In Whose Best Interests?’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 700. 
99
 Shaun D Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (Sweet and Maxwell, 2006) 65. One example of where 
parents may consent to a non-therapeutic intervention can be found in ritual circumcision where there is no 
clinical need for the operation. See John M Hutson, ‘Circumcision: A Surgeon’s Perspective’ (2003) 30 
Journal of Medical Ethics 238  who discusses the possible protective effects of circumcision and their 
alternatives and further exploration of the issue in Lynn Hagger, The Child as Vulnerable Patient: 
Protection and Empowerment (Ashgate, 2009), Chapter 3. 
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difficulties, the lack of evidence of longer term substantial harm is likely to be seen as 
legally permissible.  
 
We should not be too hasty to depart from the view that parents have a 
fundamental interest in their children’s welfare, although, clearly, parents do sometimes 
harm their children.100  Generally, they have a stake in the child’s well-being and possess 
unique, detailed knowledge of their child as well as high levels of empathy.101 It may be 
thought that the idea that parents would consider giving their children cognitive 
enhancement with both known and unknown side effects is far-fetched. However, these 
doubts can be dispelled.102 Salvemini103 discusses the risks of children taking growth 
hormone and notes that 42 percent of prescriptions are off-label in the US which indicates 
that parents are willing to take these risks. She describes parents’ aesthetic preferences 
for taller children,104 even where their children are only two standard deviations below 
the mean for height, but still part of the normal distribution of height.105 They are 
prepared to give these drugs to their children even though they carry significant risks 
                                                 
100
 David P Southall, Michael C Plunkett, Martin W Banks, Adrian F Falkov and Martin P Samuels, 
‘Covert Video recordings of Life-Threatening Child Abuse’ (1997) 100 Paediatrics 735. 
101
 See the discussion in An NHS Trust v MB [2006] 2 FCR 319 discussed further in Hagger (n 99).  
102
 Singh and Kelleher (n 24)  9. 
103
 Vita M Salvemini, ‘Idiopathic Short Stature or Just Plain Short: Why the Federal government Should 
regulate the Administration of Human Growth Hormone to healthy Children’ (2003) 38 Georgia Law 
Review 1105.   
104
 Ibid  1109. 
105
 Ibid 1113. 
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such as kidney failure.106 The evidence of increasing use that is fuelled by parental 
requests has led to a call for ethical approval for such uses.107 Given that parents are 
willing to enhance their offspring in this way, despite the possibility of dangerous side 
effects, it follows that many would be willing to cognitively enhance. 
 
Diaz108 notes the increasing use of Prozac in the US, which is not approved for 
use in children but is prescribed off-label, so parents should have been informed that the 
risks of taking this drug in a young, growing body and developing brain are yet to be 
definitively determined. There is some evidence that it does little to relieve childhood 
depression and can precipitate ‘psychotic panic’ in seriously troubled children.109 Powers 
echoes some of these concerns when noting parents’ role in the ‘race for perfection’ and 
the influence of parents’ ideals.110 In striving to optimise their child’s life-chances as they 
see it, parents will go to great lengths: Chiumino describes a case where parents 
campaigned against a nurse’s refusal to prescribe Ritalin despite the known and unknown 
side effects.111 This echoes Albright’s concern about parents making poor choices in 
                                                 
106
 Ibid 1130. 
107
 Ibid 1143. 
108
 Letitia M Diaz, ‘Regulating the Administration of Mood-Altering Drugs to Juveniles: Are We Legally 
Drugging Our Children?’ (2001)  25 Seton Hall Legislative Journal 83, 103. 
109
 Ibid 105. 
110
 Therese Powers, ‘Race for Perfection: Children's Rights and Enhancement Drugs’ (1998) 13 Journal of 
Law and Health 141, 152. 
111
 Ann Chiumino, ‘Class Action Suits Prompt Governmental Action to Examine Ritalin Use and 
Regulation’ (2001) 13(4) Loyola Consumer Review 380, 391. 
THIS IS A PRE-PEER REVIEWED DRAFT. PUBLISHED VERSION 
AVAILABLE AT http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/175799611796399867 
 23
relation to the use of psychotropic drugs in their children to improve their academic 
success.112 
 
It is not hard to imagine that doctors can just as easily succumb to parental 
pressure in the UK and be willing to prescribe cognitive enhancing drugs.113 Some 
doctors will have concerns about long-term risks and/or have doubts about the ethical 
justification for their use while others will be persuaded by arguments that support their 
use. Although the NHS is unlikely to fund drugs that are not clinically indicated, private 
prescriptions could be readily available.   
 
Where there are disputes about whether parents are acting in the child’s best 
interests, the courts will be the final arbiter. For cases decided under the Children Act 
1989, section 1(3) provides a checklist to guide the court in assessing what course of 
action would be in the child’s best interests: in medical cases this is seen as synonymous 
with the welfare of the child.114  A wide range of factors should be taken into account as a 
matter of good practice115 adopting the formulation of best interests as it is applied to 
incompetent adults with respect to medical treatment.116  Here we see a broad reading of 
                                                 
112
 Jennifer Albright, ‘Free Your Mind: The Right of Minors in New York to Choose Whether or Not to be 
Treated with Psychotropic Drugs’ (2006) 16 Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology 169, 188-193. 
113
 Singh and Kelleher (n 24) 12. 
114
 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation)  [2001] 2 WLR 480, 512. 
115
 Re J [1999] 2 FCR 345 (circumcision) and Re C [2003] EWCA Civ 1148 (immunisation). 
116
 Wyatt and another v Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust and another [2005] EWCA Civ 1181, para 79. 
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the best interests’ principle encompassing medical, emotional and other welfare factors117 
including the psychological and social benefit to the individual.118 The potential effects of 
cognitive enhancement incorporate all these aspects and would need to be given serious 
consideration.  
  
The court must have regard to the wishes and feelings of the child concerned as 
far as they can be ascertained according to their age and understanding.119  This should 
help to inform about their needs,120 their particular characteristics121as well as the likely 
effect of any proposed intervention.122  Decision-making needs to be more structured in 
relation to cognitive enhancement. It carries more significant implications than other 
decisions parents take to improve children’s life chances. Music lessons and private 
education are not of the same order:123 [t]he new forms of neuroenhancement can 
nonetheless be distinguished in terms of proximity to the neural level and the more direct, 
immediate and long-term effects on the brain they will likely have.’124 Participatory 
decision-making can be used with very young children, even where they are deemed to 
                                                 
117
 Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 per Dame Butler-Sloss P, 555. 
118
 Re Y [1997] 2 WLR 556, 562. Latterly, the courts have been enthusiastic about adopting a balance sheet 
approach whereby a list is drawn up of benefits and burdens of proposed courses of action: see, for 
example, Wyatt ( n 116). 
119
 S 3(1) (a). 
120
 S 3(1) (b). 
121
 S 3(1) (d). 
122
 S 1 (3) (c). 
123
 Cf BMA (n 12) 23. 
124
 Ravelingien et al (n 57) 152. 
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be legally incompetent because they still bear interests that should be taken into 
account125 and empirical evidence suggest that children can make significant decisions 
even at a very young age.126 
 
A note of caution seems apposite here. It should not be assumed that the guiding 
light of the welfare principle provided by the Children Act 1989 will necessarily lead to 
the correct decision. The welfare principle can be seen as unpredictable, lacking in 
substance, susceptible to bias, and can mean a child’s interests are insufficiently 
acknowledged.127 As James has pointed out,128 the courts can be only too ready to ‘deny 
children’s ability to behave and decide responsibly and to set aside their wishes and 
feelings, it also demonstrates the power of the language of welfare and how it can be used 
to deny children’s agency.129  
 
As far as older, potentially competent children are concerned, interfering with 
their decision to take cognitive enhancement (or to impose it upon them) interferes with 
                                                 
125
 See Jane Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (Butterworths, 2nd edn 2003) for a useful 
survey of the development of the notion of children’s rights, particularly Chapter 1. 
126
 Discussed further in Hagger (n 99), Chapter 2. 
127
 Helen Reece, ‘The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus of Construct?’ (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 
267, 303. 
128
 Adrian James, ‘Responsibility, Children and Childhood’ in Jo Bridgeman, Heather Keating  and Craig 
Lind (eds) Responsibility, Law and the Family (Ashgate, 2008) discussing Re W (Contact: Joining Child as 
Party  [2001] EWCA Civ 1830. 
129
 Ibid 153. 
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their autonomy.130 It may seem unlikely that parents will impose cognitive enhancement 
on older children but coercion takes many forms and we have seen the US evidence that 
parents will take risks with respect to the medication of their children.131 There is no 
reason to believe that parents in the UK are not prepared to undertake similar risks. 
Duress or other interference in such decision-making may not only violate children’s 
autonomy, but prevent them from ‘owning’ their own educational success and maintain 
their cognitive abilities and personality traits.  This gives children a particularly strong 
case to be involved in decisions about whether they should take cognitive enhancers or 
not. The call for mature children to make their own decisions has many proponents, 
because there is persuasive empirical evidence that children are more capable than is 
generally thought to be the case: they can understand the implications of what they are 
deciding.132 This plea has a particular force where the intervention is not clinically 
necessary, as in the case of cognitive enhancement.   
 
 The capacity of anyone over 16 is now determined under the empowering Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA).133 There is a rebuttable presumption of capacity under the 
                                                 
130
 For a discussion of children’s right to autonomy and its scope see Hagger (n 99), Chapter 2. 
131
 See n 102ff. 
132
 See eg Priscilla Alderson, Children’s Consent to Surgery (OUP, 1993); Christine Eiser, ‘Changes in 
understanding of illness as the child grows’ (1985) 60 Archives of Disease in Childhood 489-492 and Katy 
Sutcliffe, Priscilla Alderson and Katherine Curtis, Children as Partners in Their Diabetes Care (Institute of 
Education, University of London, 2004) <http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/ssru_docs/DiabetesReportFinal.pdf > 
accessed 14 March 2011and Hagger (n 99), Ch 2.  
133
 S 2(5). 
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MCA134  and a requirement to take all practicable steps to help the individual make that 
decision,135 which may be significant.136 Gillick137 provided a precedent for furthering the 
interests of children under 16, because it established their right to consent to medical 
interventions provided they have ‘sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him 
or her to understand fully what is proposed’ even in the face of parental opposition.138 
Subsequent cases retracted from this empowering decision by not allowing competent 
children to refuse treatment.139 The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has begun to 
emphasise the importance of children’s autonomy. By largely incorporating the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the HRA provides an 
opportunity to challenge traditional notions of children’s ability to make decisions.140 
Articles 3 and 8 have particular relevance in relation to cognitive enhancement. 
 
                                                 
134
 S 1(2). 
135
 S 1(3).  
136
 Discussed in Hagger (n 99). There are onerous requirements contained in Part 2, Chapter 3 of the Code 
of Practice in some detail as to what might be expected including appropriate settings and the use of aids. 
Additionally, a person is not to be assumed to lack capacity merely because of their age or appearance (s. 
2(3)), or because others believe they have made an unwise decision (s. 1(4)) thus capturing the common 
law approach in  Re W [2002] EWHC 901) for example. 
137
 Gillick (n 90) 127 and discussed further in Hagger (n 99). 
138
 Gillick ibid per Lord Lord Scarman, 189. 
139
 Eg Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Medical Treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177. 
140
 See Hagger (n 99) for further discussion on this point. 
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Dignity is protected by Article 3 of the ECHR. This prohibits the infliction of 
inhuman and degrading treatment but is likely to be infringed only in extreme cases.141  
Currently, a failure to assess competence accurately is unlikely to constitute a breach, but 
if this is followed by very significant medical intervention, then it could be regarded as a 
form of harm.  Generally, therapeutically necessary treatment without consent would not 
constitute inhuman and degrading treatment.142   Conversely, the imposition of 
enhancement (by definition an intervention that is not clinically indicated and one that 
potentially interferes with identity), without appropriate consultation with the child 
and/or without sufficient risk information, could easily fall foul of Article 3.  This is even 
more likely to be the case if there is any element of compulsion.143 Of course, many 
might assert that the practical reality is that parents and/or doctors are unlikely to force 
young people to take cognitive enhancing drugs against their will when life is not at risk, 
but there is a need to be alert to different levels of coercion. Pushing children to excel can 
be subtle or overt as can be seen from the US evidence.144  
  
The focus here is on Article 8(1), which requires respect for private and family 
life. This would be at the centre of any claim now made by the mature minor who 
                                                 
141
 See eg D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423 and Z v UK [2001] 2 FLR 612. 
142
 Herczegfalvy v Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437. 
143
 Case law under the Mental Health Act 1983 illustrates how the HRA adds a further protection to 
existing barriers to compulsory treatment in cases where patients resist it. See eg R (on the application of 
PS) v G (RMO) and W (SOAD) [2003] EWHC 2335 (Fam) regarding unnecessary compulsory treatment 
and Keenan v UK (2001) EHRR 38 with respect to unreasonable physical force. 
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believes their autonomy has received insufficient recognition: there may have been a 
failure to consult them on their views or they may wish to argue that their refusal of 
enhancement should not be overridden by the court and/or their parents. Not only is 
Article 8(1) particularly important because it can support a child’s autonomy, but also 
because it protects the right to dignity145 which may be affected by cognitive 
enhancement.  If we accept that personality traits are a core aspect of identity146 which 
may be altered by cognitive enhancement intentionally or otherwise, this can be seen as 
an infringement of dignity. A person’s psychological integrity may be disrupted by 
changing the way they feel and represent themselves147 and traits may be removed that 
have important values that may not yet be discovered.148 As the Strasbourg court said in 
Pretty v United Kingdom:149[t]he very essence of the Convention is respect for human 
dignity and human freedom.150 Commenting on the ‘physical and psychological integrity’ 
point raised in Botta v Italy,151, Munby J in R (on application of A, B, X, & Y) v East 
Sussex County Council (No. 2),152 took the view that this, inter alia, embraced the 
concepts of human dignity. Thus dignity has clear protection under the law.  The broad 
                                                 
145
 See the discussion at n 67ff on how this may be conceived.  
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 Soldz and Vaillant (n 70). 
147
 Martin and Ashcroft (n 59). 
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 Eg Paul J Watson and Paul W Andrews, `Toward a revised evolutionary adaptationist analysis of 
depression: the social navigation hypothesis' (2002) 72(1) Journal of Affective Disorders 1.  
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 (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
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 At para 65. 
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 Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241. 
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reading given to Article 8(1) includes ‘attacks on his physical or mental integrity or his 
moral or intellectual freedom’.153 In the context of children, this is relevant because the 
imposition of cognitive enhancement can undermine their right to make such a decision 
for themselves.  
  
The judiciary has begun to adopt a stance towards the mature minor’s autonomy 
that is more aligned to the liberal interpretation of Gillick. In R (Axon) v Secretary of 
State for Health (Family Planning Association intervening),154 Gillick was revisited in the 
light of Mrs Axon’s right to family life under Article 8(1) of the HRA155 in that she 
wished to be informed if either of her daughters, then aged 12 and 15, sought an abortion. 
Silber J indicated that the international instruments illustrate: ‘. . . that the right of young 
people to make decisions about their own lives by themselves at the expense of the views 
of their parents has now become an increasingly important and accepted feature of family 
life.’156  
                                                 
153
 Jacques Velu , ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Right to Respect for Private Life, the 
Home and Communications’ in Arthur H Robertson (ed), Privacy and Human Rights (Manchester 
University Press, 1973) 12, 92. 
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 R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health (Family Planning Association intervening) [2006] EWHC 37 
(Admin). 
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 In relation to Guidance for Doctors and other Health Professionals on the Provision of Advice and 
Treatment to Young People under 16 on Contraception, Sexual and Reproductive Heath (29 July 2004), 
Gateway Reference No 3382.  Relevant parts of the Guidance are set out at [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin), at 
paras 22 - 24. 
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 Axon (n 154) citing Articles 16(1) and 12(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
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 More recently, in Re P,157 Johnson J was prepared to acknowledge that there 
might be cases where older children would be permitted to refuse to receive blood 
products. Further cases decided less unequivocally would encourage a further shift in 
attitudes because these cases, which purportedly protect child autonomy, also have a 
strong focus on child welfare.158 In addition, Silber J’s judgment in Axon159 suggests that 
the Fraser guidelines for assessing competence160 require a very high level of 
understanding of the decision to be made, and that the decision is in the child’s best 
interests if it is made without parental knowledge or consent.  
 
Using Gillick cautiously in determining children’s competence is dubious. Using 
age161 and traditional measures of general intelligence alone is a poor measure of a 
child’s capacity to understand and meaningfully engage with medical information.162 
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 Bro Morgannwg NHS Trust v ‘P’ and others [2003] EWHC 2327 (Fam) (Re P). 
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 Mabon (n 89) para 29. 
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 Axon (n 154). 
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Notwithstanding the emphasis the judiciary places on understanding the implications of a 
decision in cases concerning mature minor’s competence to consent, the evidence is that 
using age to determine capacity continues even in institutions that purport to focus on the 
individual child’s rights.163 Such a position fails to acknowledge the importance of 
contextual factors in cognitive development including any particular perspective a child 
may have gained. 164 Evidence suggests that experience of illness, disability and 
treatment is a more indicative factor in assessing competency than age.165 Cognitive 
maturity is often related directly to age but this provides a very general indicator of a 
child’s cognitive competence because children develop at different rates across a range of 
situations.166 Research167 highlights how young children’s cognition appears to be 
‘hardwired’ enabling them to process and interpret the demands of their world at a very 
early age. Psychologists, who adopt contemporary mainstream thinking in this area, 
prefer to assess profiles of children’s cognitive competencies in both broad and specific 
abilities.168  
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 BMA working party on children’s consent < http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Content/consenttk2> 
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There is anecdotal and other evidence that where parents and health professionals 
agree with a child who does not wish to receive even life-saving treatment, the child’s 
decision is allowed to stand169 but practice is inconsistent.170 Of course, notwithstanding 
the support for children’s involvement in decision-making preferred here, there will 
always be those who adopt a more protectionist stance. Some commentators believe that 
encouraging children to make mature decisions unnecessarily redraws the boundary 
between childhood and adulthood and that the focus should be on the child in the 
present.171 Similarly, Feinberg argues that intervening in the lives of children for the sake 
of the child’s future autonomy, their ‘right to an open future’,172 where a child’s decision 
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or behaviour is such that it threatens her own future is justified. Mental ability is 
demonstrably affected by cognitive enhancement and other commentators have proposed 
a more precautionary approach for its use with children more specifically.173  
 
The paternalistic arguments outlined above fail to convince. There will always be 
a need to strike a balance between a child’s need for protection vis-à-vis the importance 
of promoting their capacity for self-determination.174 Account must always be taken of 
the physical and mental differences between children and adults, but these are not always 
accurately assessed.175 The argument here is that a child’s autonomy should be respected 
where the child has demonstrated that they clearly meets the legal standard for 
establishing capacity and that the process for doing so takes account of the broad range of 
factors affecting cognitive maturity alluded to here. Sophisticated measures of cognitive 
social maturity176 can introduce a welcome element of objectivity into any assessment of 
whether a child can satisfy a requirement to be able not only to understand information, 
but to weigh it up when reaching a decision. Given decisions about cognitive 
                                                 
173
 Turner and Sahakian (2006) (n 45) and Farah et al (n 2). 
174
 See Michael Freeman, The Rights and Wrongs of Children (Pinter, 1983) Chapter 2 and Hagger  (n 99) 
for an outline of what may constitute a child’s right to autonomy. 
175
 Mary Donnelly, ‘Capacity assessment under the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Delivering on the functional 
approach?’ (2009) 29(3) Legal Studies 464. 
176
 Eg Carolyn E Levers-Landis, Rachel N Greenley, Chris Burantand Elaine Borawski, ‘Cognitive Social 
Maturity, Life Change Events, and Health Risk Behaviors among Adolescents: Development of a Structural 
Equation Model’ (2006) 13(2) Journal of Clinical Psychology in Medical Settings 111. 
THIS IS A PRE-PEER REVIEWED DRAFT. PUBLISHED VERSION 
AVAILABLE AT http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/175799611796399867 
 35
enhancement involves calculations about future risk-benefit ratios, levels of competence 
will need to be suitably high.177  
 
Putting pressure on a mature minor to accept cognitive enhancement or 
preventing them from taking it is an irrevocable step that cannot be ameliorated by 
allowing them to take such decisions on their own in the future. Any sense of violation of 
their autonomous interests may not subside and makes no logical sense because they will 
not become more legally competent in the future.  
 
As well as ensuring children and young people are as involved as possible in 
personal decisions about taking cognitive enhancement, opportunities should be provided 
to be engaged in policy formulation about its use more generally. 178 Not only do they 
have the ability to be meaningfully involved at this level, any resulting policies are likely 
to be more pertinent to this age group. More importantly, children’s views about health 
and health services differ from those of their parents and professionals with whom they 
are in contact.179 Therefore adopting their perspective will lead to more appropriate 
healthcare as perceived by them. 
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B. Children and Policy-Making 
 
In the light of evidence that children are competent social actors, there should be more 
concerted efforts to involve them in policy making. The United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC) is seen as pivotal in relation to the call for greater 
recognition of children and young people to not only express their views but also to have 
these acted upon.180   
 
The Convention underpins the United Kingdom’s approach to children but some 
of its key Articles are not reflected fully in law, policy and practice, in common with 
most other jurisdictions.181 Some changes in the representation of young people in the 
policy arena have taken place and this should be replicated in policy formulation with 
respect to cognitive enhancement. At this level, as scientific discoveries about the brain 
are made, medical practice, legal interpretations and health and social policy should be 
addressed from a wide perspective, along with full involvement by those directly 
affected.  Decision-making is improved when a breadth of opinion is taken into account 
                                                 
180
 Articles 12 and 13 in particular. 
181
 Lothar Krappmann, ‘The weight of the child’s view (Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child’, (2010) 18(4) International Journal of Children’s Rights 501. Children’s Rights Alliance for 
England, Convention on the Rights of the Child: Review of UK Government Action on 2003 Concluding 
Observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. Children’s Rights Alliance for England: 
London and see  Allison James and Adrian L James, Constructing Childhood: Theory, Policy and Social 
Practice (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2004), Chapter 4 passim.  
THIS IS A PRE-PEER REVIEWED DRAFT. PUBLISHED VERSION 
AVAILABLE AT http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/175799611796399867 
 37
by drawing on different areas of expertise.182 The proposal here is that the child should be 
a central part of the policy-making process to ensure their interests are fully protected.183  
 
There is a growing recognition of a need for participation where health care 
services are provided for young people in the context of enhanced user involvement more 
generally,184 the rights agenda185 and the growing acknowledgement that children are 
competent social actors.186  Young people should also be consulted on issues that concern 
everyone, not just those that affect them.  We need an approach that is child-centred 
rather than just child-focused, so that children are valued, respected, treated as 
individuals, accorded the same rights as everyone else and whose engagement is seen as 
part of a jointly negotiated process. 
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 Jasanoff187 argues that the most powerful argument for wider lay participation in 
decision-making is the public’s ‘critical supervision’: 
 
[E]xpertise is constituted within institutions, and powerful institutions can perpetuate unjust and 
unfounded ways of looking at the world unless they are continually put before the gaze of 
laypersons who will declare when the emperor has no clothes’.188 
 
Some organisations have developed a track record in working with participants who are 
not expected to cope with traditional, formal approaches.  To hear the voice of young 
people presents even greater challenges but there are a number of participation 
‘frameworks’ and benchmarking tools for working with children and young people.189  
The specific engagement of children in the citizenship agenda has been encouraged 
because it prepares them for the appropriate exercise of adult rights, rather than to 
empower them to exercise political influence in their own right.190 Young people do care 
about policies as they affect them and even quite young children can articulate their 
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views.191  They can develop to the point where they also care about issues where they are 
less directly affected192 so they must be seen as full partners listened to as they are now 
and not merely because of the person they will become. Examples of organisations that 
have begun to use children and young people effectively include the Carnegie Young 
People Initiative which aims to increase the breadth of young people’s participation in 
public decision-making and improve its quality.193 The establishment of a Children and 
Young People’s Unit in 2001 within the Department of Education and Skills, which 
advises the Government on the development of policies for children and young people, 
has been welcomed as providing a key impetus for their involvement in policy, service 
design and delivery.  Funky Dragon’s (the Welsh Youth Council and the Children and 
Young People’s Assembly for Wales)194 main task is to make sure that the views of 
children and young people are heard, particularly by the Welsh Assembly Government. It 
has been quoted as an exemplar by the previous Children’s Commissioner for England.195   
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Public involvement in the health agenda specifically, apart from the limited 
participation within National Institute for Health and Clinical Effectiveness,196 takes 
place mainly at a local level.  The Care Quality Commission’s regional teams are 
building networks of community-based groups and groups led by users through their 
recent consultation process so that they can engage with local people on issues that 
concern them.197 This will increase children and young people’s involvement in the 
healthcare agenda, as will their role as associate governors in foundation trusts, but they 
need more presence at a national level. 
 
The law needs to establish very clear principles about access to cognitive 
enhancement. Whatever form this takes, it must take cognisance of the increasing 
recognition of children’s autonomy: in international instruments, empirical evidence of 
their existing cognitive abilities, developing case law and their involvement in policy-
making discussed here. The final section of this paper explores a range of approaches that 
could be adopted to address access to cognitive enhancement by children. 
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IV. APPROPRIATE DECISION-MAKING: TO COGNITIVELY ENHANCE OR NOT?  
 
While not wishing to diminish the importance of the ethical debates surrounding 
cognitive enhancement, especially in relation to children, the focus here is on the process 
by which decisions are reached. The discussion that follows examines a range of 
regulatory approaches that could be used to govern access to cognitive enhancement in 
children. 
 
Conventional law and economics adhere to notions of what Jolls, Sunstein and 
Thaler198 term ‘consumer sovereignty’, whereby citizens are seen as the best judges of 
what is in their interests with the important caveat that they need reasonable access to 
relevant information. This could include whether to take cognitive enhancement. 
However, they note that decisions may be impaired as a result of cognitive and 
motivational difficulties, such as underestimation of risks even with the provision of 
adequate information.199 Further behavioral research has indicated that people’s 
assessment of future experience can be mistaken.200 In addition, to leave the availability 
of cognitive enhancement to market forces would offer no means of protecting children’s 
interests, nor would there be any guarantee that sufficient information on possible risks 
would be provided. Actors, particularly children, do not have equal power.201 This may 
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be an example of where the community may be prepared to allow some form of 
regulation for all of these reasons, although it cannot be assumed that government 
agencies will not have their capabilities similarly impaired albeit to a lesser extent if 
wide-ranging, relevant views are taken into account.202  
 
Coteanu203 argues that new approaches are required for what she terms ’cyber 
consumer protection’. This has particular relevance here because of the prevalence of 
cognitive enhancing drugs advertised on the Internet. Consumer transactions take place in 
a global marketplace and there needs to be a means of safeguarding reasonable consumer 
expectations in this context. We agree that there needs to be regulation in this area, but 
maintain that cognitive enhancing drugs will continue to be sought through other sources 
not least because concern is increasing about the fraudulent supply of drugs more 
generally on the Internet.204 Regulating access to enhancing drugs through the Internet is 
a possibility and the European Court of Justice is poised to address the issue of 
international Internet jurisdiction.205 Problems may nonetheless remain as the tobacco 
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advertising example outlined below illustrates and, in the case of cognitive enhancement, 
the risks are not as clearly established as those in relation to tobacco consumption.  
 
 It might have been thought that the use of cognitive enhancement could be 
regulated by the European Union (EU) given its broad reach. However, Mossialos, 
Permanand, Baeten and Hervey206 note that there is no legislative basis in the EU for a 
common approach to such public health measures.207 Any provisions with this goal in 
mind have been achieved through internal market law, soft law, and also through the use 
of EU-funded projects to create and disseminate information that is subsequently used in 
legislative processes to promote public health. Market bans are only effective where they 
are the result of interest group lobbying that is sufficiently powerful to overcome the 
converse pressure from the industry. This is proven in the case of tobacco, where bans on 
advertising failed to have an impact on the industry, because it did not have the effect of 
reducing market access.208 Some comfort may be derived from the Council non-binding 
recommendation209 that Member States adopt measures to restrict methods of tobacco 
advertising that have no cross-border effects. Such soft law can sometimes be a precursor 
                                                 
206
 Elias Mossialos, Govin Permanand, Rita Baeten and Tamara K Hervey, Health Systems Governance in 
Europe: the Role of EU Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chapter 5. 
207
 Article 129 (now 152) of the EC Treaty expressly excludes the ability to take harmonizing measures for 
public health purposes. 
208
 ASPECT Consortium, Tobacco or Health in the European Union: past, present and future, The 
ASPECT Report (European Communities, 2004) and Jolls et al (n 198) 1516. 
209
 Council Recommendation on the prevention of smoking and on initiatives to improve tobacco control, 
OJ [2003] L 22/31. 
THIS IS A PRE-PEER REVIEWED DRAFT. PUBLISHED VERSION 
AVAILABLE AT http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/175799611796399867 
 44
to future hard law measures, when the legal and political climate allows;210 this approach 
could be deployed with respect to the regulation of cognitive enhancement. In addition, 
EU governing institutions have achieved some measure of success to achieve public 
health goals through the judicious use of limited resources in carefully targeted areas. 
These have sometimes led to larger scale, more integrated sets of policy-making tools and 
institutions, supported by a long-term financial framework. The EU exercises influence 
through information collection, dissemination, development of best practice and 
networking with key stakeholders.211 If relevant EU institutions decide to focus on 
cognitive enhancement in such a way and influence some of the UK’s organisations 
discussed below, they may be similarly successful in ensuring a greater likelihood for its 
appropriate use. Some form of regulation of cognitive enhancement seems desirable at 
least to ensure that only products from bona fide sources are advertised to deal with 
concerns about their origins and thus their authenticity.  
 
It is also worth noting that notwithstanding the promising rhetoric arising from the 
Treaty of Lisbon 2009 where it was stated that the protection of the rights of the child 
was a core objective of the EU, there is a distinct lack of legal and practical competence 
in this area.212 Encouraging the participation of children in policy formulation using the 
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soft law approaches outlined above and supported by the European Commission’s 
Strategy on the Rights of the Child may help in this regard.213  
 
 In the current absence of EU regulation, can the UK adopt a regime that protects 
children when decisions are being taken about cognitive enhancement? One proposal 
might be to ban enhancement drugs, but policing illicit drug use already creates huge 
resourcing difficulties214 and these drugs are less clearly harmful.  Such a ban seems 
impracticable because access is so easily available on the Internet215 and there seems to 
be little appetite for control,216 notwithstanding calls for global regulation.217 
Nevertheless, many people may prefer a more reliable route to obtain these drugs. If, as 
has been advocated earlier, parents are not best placed to decide whether children should 
receive cognitive enhancement, should doctors make the decision?  
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Doctors already regulate access to drugs218 and patients cannot demand treatment 
against their clinical judgment.219 Doctors are likely to become ever more cost-conscious 
as the purchasing power of services within the NHS shifts to them.220 Cognitive 
enhancement could be offered by doctors if a broad view is taken of the need to promote 
patients’ quality of life. Their medical knowledge will be invaluable about the long-term 
impact of enhancement drugs, as such information becomes more available. They may 
also have an established relationship of trust with their patient. However, leaving the 
decision-making to doctors alone is problematic because of concerns that doctors already 
over-prescribe221 or under-prescribe222 certain drugs and, more importantly, this is as 
paternalistic as leaving this to parents. For incompetent children, there is no reason to 
assume doctors have the skills and knowledge required to make more than a clinical 
assessment as to what an appropriate intervention might be. The wider factors to be 
considered in determining best interests require, arguably, a range of views.  As 
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Ravelingien et al point out,223 the idea that cognitive enhancement is as morally suspect 
as cosmetic surgery is not clear cut so should not necessarily be resisted by doctors as 
they act as gatekeepers,. Some may prefer not to carry out this function because of 
concerns about the ethics of cognitive enhancement or a lack of expertise. Conscientious 
objection should be available for them. Equally, some may be strongly in support of 
cognitive enhancement. It should not be within their gift to decide whether cognitive 
enhancement is a social harm.224 It is advocated here that only doctors providing the 
service along the lines discussed below should be accredited to provide the service.  The 
final decision would be for the patient or their parent(s) ideally following a discussion 
exploring the broad implications of taking cognitive enhancement for themselves and 
others.225 Of course, if the doctor has a veto on what is offered, then they are clearly in a 
dominant position and patients can always refuse treatment a doctor thinks is appropriate.   
 
 If we accept that there will inevitably be medical involvement in decision-making 
about enhancement,226 we would support the robust approach advocated by Alderson and 
Montgomery. They call for legislation supported by a code of practice covering all 
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aspects of children’s healthcare decision-making.227  The code could be drafted after 
consultation with those involved with children and the children themselves.228  The basic 
principles would be contained in the framework legislation, with the code providing the 
more detailed guidance and checklists of appropriate issues particularly in difficult cases.  
It would require procedures and policies in place to deal with potential problems.  Any 
departure from the standards of good practice in the code could provide evidence of a 
breach in a negligence action where harm can be demonstrated, unless this could be 
justified in the individual case.  This approach would be supplemented by the usual 
internal complaints procedures, professional disciplinary action and be overseen by the 
courts.  Most importantly, central to their proposals is the participation of the child in the 
decision-making process which can be supported by empirical evidence of children’s 
abilities and the trajectory of their human rights. 
 
Alderson and Montgomery’s proposals for legislation may seem unlikely given 
the failure to include children under 16 within the remit of the MCA.  This would have 
provided an ideal opportunity to ensure as robust an approach to decision-making to this 
group as to older children.229 Nevertheless, much of the guidance envisaged in their 
suggestion for a code of practice could be adopted within suitably invigorated existing 
regulatory structures. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHpRA) could more closely follow the model provided by the licensing and inspection 
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regime under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as amended.230 This 
may be seen as disproportionate to the issues raised by cognitive enhancement, but the 
1990 Act’s provisions and the guidance offered in its evolving Code of Practice is an 
instructive model231 nonetheless.  One of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology’s 
Authority’s232 key strengths lies in its range of expertise, including lay members’ 
opinions, when developing policies.233  In the approach suggested here, this should 
include children. The MHpRA could license enhancement drugs only to those doctors in 
the NHS or private sector who can demonstrate good decision-making practice that 
optimises children’s involvement  by providing evidence of the information that will be 
provided, to whom and how the decision will be reached.  The approach would, of 
course, be supplemented by the possibility of using alternative grievance procedures. At 
the policy-making level, the Agency could employ the participatory tools developed to 
help with the engagement of children and young people adopting the points of good 
practice from the models where this has been used to good effect. It is worth emphasising 
that the approach should be child-centred not merely child-focused, so that children and 
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young people can comment on issues that concern everyone and enjoy the same rights as 
adults. 
 
To bolster the regulatory approach outlined above, guidance should be adopted 
that uses rights-based language when discussing children while at the same time 
nurturing a sense of responsibility. The use of rights discourse is important because 
language can be seen as an important instrument of social change:234 the more we talk 
about children’s rights, the more society will attend to their interests in an appropriate 
manner. Guidance should be consistent across the NHS so that whether it is issued by the 
Department of Health, the National Centre for Health and Clinical Excellence, health 
professional bodies, such as the General Medical Council or British Medical Association, 
and/or the Royal Colleges who set standards of practice for the various specialisms, the 
message will be the same. There are attractions in this proposal, because guidance can 
easily reach the large numbers of prescribing health professionals in the public and 
private sector, but there may be concerns as to adherence.  There would be significant 
reliance on patients and colleagues alerting relevant professional bodies in the event of 
                                                 
234
 Selected writings of Benjamin L Whorf in John B Carroll (ed), Language , thought and reality   (MIT 
Press, 1956) 252. Whorf was the most prominent, modern proponent of the idea that patterns of the 
language we use affects the configuration of our thought and thus our culture: our view of the world is 
determined by language. ‘Weak determinism’ whereby the influence of language on thought is recognised, 
remains persuasive: see eg Izchak M Schlesinger, ‘The wax and wane of Whorfian views’ in Robert L 
Cooper and Bernard Spolsky (eds.), The Influence of Language on Culture and Thought  (Mouton de 
Gruyter, 1991) 19-29. The British Institute for Human Rights, The Human Rights Act: Changing Lives, 
2007 demonstrates how the use of rights-based language and ideas can help to change cultures. 
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non-compliance.  This is not always forthcoming.  Should a matter be referred however, 
strong disciplinary action could foster an appropriate culture of compliance.235 Improved 
appraisal through the revalidation of doctors in both the public and private sectors due to 
commence in 2012 will provide another important tool to encourage appropriate 
intervention with patients.236 More importantly, clinical governance structures within 
organisations are paying increasing attention to quality as well as safety standards and 
this can act as an important lever. The Operating Framework for the NHS in England237 
requires each NHS trust to obtain feedback from patients about their experience of care. 
Part of the Care Quality Commission’s remit is to regulate healthcare wherever it is 
provided and it uses data from its ongoing programme of patient surveys to calculate this 
indicator.238 This revitalised239 focus on patient experience will include methods of 
engagement with patients.240 
                                                 
235
 One of the authors has a long association with the NHS and it is clear that decisions and 
recommendations from bodies such as the GMC become widely known within and without organisations. 
This can result in more rigorous compliance by affected individuals and the issue gains a focus through 
clinical governance mechanisms.  
236
 Licence to Practice and Revalidation for doctors', GMC publications, April 2003 and Revalidation: A 
Statement of Intent, 2010: 
<http://www.gmc-
uk.org/Revalidation_A_Statement_of_Intent_October_2010__Final_version___web_version_.pdf_359823
97.pdf_36401645.pdf > accessed 14 March 2011. 
237
 Department of Health, Operating Frameworkfor the NHS in England, 2011/2012. 
238<http://www.cqc.org.uk/periodicreview/nationalcommitmentsandpriorities2009/10/primarycaretrusts/nati
onalpriorities/patientexperience.cfm>  accessed 14 March 2011. 
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Taken as a whole, the proposals set out above should guarantee a place for 
children to be at the heart of decision-making generally and specifically where cognitive 
enhancement is concerned. Our argument builds on Turner and Sahakian’s call that:  
 
. . . healthcare professionals should be encouraged to acquire the skills to analyze scenarios on a 
case-by-case basis, bringing together an understanding of science and public policy in 
collaboration with social scientists, legislators, insurance companies, employers and educational 
authorities.241 
 
People have a right to make informed decisions242 and we should not underestimate 
people’s ability to do so.243 The risk for children is that parents who want to give their 
child the edge at school opt for enhancement under the influence of forces such as 
advertising, the views of other parents, teachers and other social forces. When parents are 
potentially in control of these decisions, an appropriate decision-making structure 
(supported by the HRA in particular), would help to ensure they do not succumb to these 
                                                                                                                                                 
239
 As a result of the scandalous treatment of patients at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust: 
Francis Report: Independent inquiry into care provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust  
January 2005 - March 2009, 2010. 
240
 Primary care trust patient experience methodology , 2010: 
http://www.cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/PCT_patient_experience_methodology.pdf accessed 14 March 
2011. 
241
 Turner and Sahakian (n 12) 119.   
242
 Chester v Afshar [2004] 4 All ER 587. 
243
 Ibid. 
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pressures too easily and that they allow children to be thoroughly engaged in the process.  
Such a framework can protect competent children by allowing them to choose or refuse 
to enhance and ensure that appropriate determination of incompetent children’s best 
interests is undertaken.   This could work alongside other regulation which would 
consider safety issues and population-wide risks. We believe a multi-pronged approach 
that involves children and young people in personal decision-making and policy 
formulation within a robust licensing and accreditation system would be appropriate 
because many parents and children may prefer to make decisions after receiving medical 
or other advice. We also believe that political decisions should be made about whether or 
not cognitive enhancers should be made available and to whom. This would help to 
address the concerns about equity and the fostering of an individualistic and competitive 
society.   
 
CONCLUSION  
 
As more information becomes available about cognitive enhancement, concerns about 
safety may be quelled. If risks are shown to be minimal, there is at least an argument that 
cognitive enhancement could have positive outcomes for children. It can be argued that 
there is a moral imperative to use technology to improve people’s life chances generally 
and this will include cognitive enhancement to improve human functioning. It has also 
been proposed that cognitive enhancement can be viewed as a human right in that it is a 
rational and practical autonomy claim in the pursuit of knowledge. However, cognitive 
enhancement may have unintended or unknown side effects such as personality, identity 
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and mental ability change that have implications for society and individuals. For the 
latter, their right to develop their character and sense of personal responsibility in an 
unmedicated state may be threatened.  Children’s dignity has also been shown to be at 
stake and further jeopardised if they are not involved in making decisions about whether 
to take cognitive enhancement to the maximum extent possible.  
 
 If we assume that neurotechnologies should be made available for enhancement 
purposes, for principled or pragmatic reasons, it is the contention of this work that 
appropriate regulation should be in place to ensure children and young people are 
properly empowered and protected. Concerns about cognitive enhancements are not 
simply ‘spectres’.244 There are substantive legal issues concerning aspects of human 
functioning that should be protected by law. Provided different perspectives of cognitive 
enhancement and potential effects are presented to legally competent children, the 
decision of whether to take it, or not, is one for them. This standpoint can be supported 
through the use of human rights instruments and empirical evidence of children’s abilities 
which may also be used to contend that they should be fully involved in policy 
formulation as well as personal decision-making. Human rights discourse allows for a 
balanced consideration of the child’s interests vis-à-vis those of their family or society 
more generally.  The broad reading of Article 8(1) of the ECHR in particular, embracing 
such notions as autonomy, development of the personality and identity, means that the 
HRA could be an important vehicle for underpinning regulation and the ongoing 
discussion about appropriate intervention. 
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 Editorial, `Enhancing, not cheating'. (2007) 450(7168) Nature 320. 
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 Where children are not legally competent, caution should be exercised in 
allowing parents to decide whether they should take cognitive enhancement because of 
the evidence that their view of best interests may be suspect. The preference here is for a 
statutory body to regulate access to cognitive enhancement through a licensing and 
inspection system supplemented by clear guidance and other clinical governance 
arrangements. Licences should only be issued where there is assurance that children and 
young people are fully involved in the decision-making process with rights of appeal. The 
body’s policy and guidance should also be informed by children and young people by 
utilising participatory tools developed to optimise their engagement. Adopting these 
suggestions would take children’s healthcare decision-making to an unprecedented level 
and one that is long overdue in light of their capacities and the international trajectory of 
their interests. 
